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2Organizational Form and Expense Preference: Spanish Experience
Abstract - This article investigates the effect of alternative ownership structures, stock versus mutual, on
the cost of production of Spanish depository institutions.  The empirical approach adjusts for the possibility
that the two sectors of the banking industry employ different production technologies and find evidence that
is consistent with the expense preference behavior by the mutual savings banks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of papers [Williamson (1963), Leibenstein (1966, 1975)] in the literature argued
against the traditional neoclassical assumption that firm management is primarily driven by profit
maximization goals, especially in an environment where there is a separation of ownership and control
of firms; less competitive and inefficient markets; and a high degree of regulatory structure.  These
papers, in general, have suggested that managers might pursue the strategy of maximization of personal
utility by favoring excessive allocation of resources in salaries, a larger staff, unnecessary perks,
privileges, and office settings.  Among others, Edwards (1977), Hannan (1979), Hannan and Mavinga
(1980), Verbrugge and Goldstein (1981), Verbrugge and Jahera (1981) found consistent evidence of
such expense preference behavior in the United States depository industries; Awh and Prim aux (1985)
in the electrical utility industry; and Fields (1988) in the mutual life insurance companies.
However the above findings are however conclusive as Rhoades (1980), Smirlock and
Marshall (1983), Blair and Placone (1988), Mester (1989), Stansell and Hollas (1990), and Carhill and
Hasan (1997) provided evidence inconsistent with expense-preference behavior among the U.S. banks
and saving and loans (S&Ls).  Using S&L data, Mester (1989) as well as Stansell and Hollas (1990)
argued that the supporting evidence of expense-preference behavior found in previous papers was
flawed from inappropriate estimation approach and, once the estimation approach was corrected, no
3such evidence was found.  The popularity of using S&L data is not surprising as the industry provides a
good opportunity to compare institutions with both the mutual and stock forms of organizations.
Unlike stock institutions, the mutual form of organizations do not undergo direct monitoring or profit-
making pressure from stock holders (owners), and, therefore, their managers may have different goals
and strategies.
This paper provides additional evidence for the existing debate on expense preference in the
depository industry and attempts to bring new perspectives to the literature.  First, this note uses data
from the Spanish depository industry which consists of both mutual and stock types of institutions.
This is the first inquiry into such issues in the Spanish as well as the European banking industry.  A high
percentage of European banks are the mutual type and the increasing merger and acquisition mania in
the European banking industry warrants a better understanding of these institutions relative to the stock
form of orgnizations.  Second, the note introduces a stochastic or econometric frontier estimation
approach to capture the extent of expense preference by these two sectors of the banking industry.
Although this methodology is used extensively in the banking literature, its specific application in the
expense preference literature is new.1 Third, the note presents a broader perspective of expense
practices by focusing not only on oninterest expenses but also on the patterns of interest expenses.
This additional comparison provides an opportunity to see whether spending patterns of institutions
with different organizational forms is consistent across different segments of businesses.  Moreover, for
further insight into the expense-preference sources, the paper decomposes noninterest expenses into
employee- and office-related expenses.  Finally, unlike similar studies in the literature, this note
provides a cross-sectional pooled time series data (1986-95) that captures the changes in managerial
discretion on expense preference over time. This is especially interesting for the Spanish depository
4industry, which has experienced changes in its regulatory environment and market structure during our
sample period.
Overall, the evidence indicates that savings banks, i.e., mutual institutions, are more noninterest
cost inefficient than commercial banks, thus supporting the presence of an expense-preference
behavior.  The results are stronger once estimations are adjusted for the appropriate production
technology. The evidence is further supported by subsequent regression estimations where the bivariate
variable representing mutual institutions report a significantly strong positive impact on n n nt rest nd
employee expense inefficiency scores.  This also suggests that mutual institutions in Spain possess a
certain level of inefficiency in the noninterest sector and therefore the institutions have additional ability
to discard inefficiency and compete even more successfully in the depository market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses some recent analyses on
organizational form and cost structure followed by a brief overview of recent developments in the
Spanish banking system.  Section III discusses data sources and presents the econometric frontier
model estimating expense-preference structure or cost inefficiency, followed by regressions model
explaining the relative role of organizational form in explaining the variability of different segments of
cost inefficiency.  Section IV presents the result, and section V the conclusion.
II.  Organizational Form and Cost Structure in Spanish Banking
Expense Preference of Mutual Form
5Researchers have long been interested in the topic of firm activities as well as property rights of
the contracting parties within an organization and their effects on managerial and owner activities and
performance [Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b)].  A
particular area of focus has been the difference of property rights associated with the mutual form of
organization versus the corporate form.  A mutual organization is one in which the depositors are the
owners with very limited control over management.  Whereas, in stock institutions, there is a
separation between owners and customers, and managers are periodically monitored by owners
(stockholders).  It is argued that such arrangements make the managers in mutual institutions engage in
various forms of expense-preference behavior that serve the managers’ interest at the expense of the
owners.   As discussed earlier, the empirical evidence on this issue is mixed.
Mester (1989) investigated the possibility of agency problems in U.S. mutual S&L institutions,
focusing on the management’s inefficient use of inputs.  She argued that one should take into account
the probable differences in the production technologies of mutual and stock institutions to avoid
reaching inaccurate conclusions about their behavior and strategy.  In an unrelated study, Mester
(1993) estimated firm efficiency, assuming that mutual and stock  institutions had different
production technologies, finding more robust evidence.  Mester (1991) reported evidence of agency
problem in mutual institutions where managers were selecting an inefficient output mix.  The paper also
revealed that a stock institution’s ability to acquire financing from the capital market could lead to
differences in cost structures between the two groups.  However, in a somewhat similar study,
Cebenoyan et al. (1993) could not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the cost frontiers
were equal for mutual and stock institutions.  Following Mester (1993), this note also extends the
6debate on the importance of differentiating production technology among groups of different
organizational forms in the Spanish banking environment.
Spanish Banking System: Recent Developments
In the Spanish banking system (SBS), there are primarily two sectors: commercial banks
and savings banks, organized as stock and mutual institutions respectively.  Commercial banks were
traditionally more corporate business oriented as opposed to savings banks that were involved
primarily in retail services to households and smaller business entities in restricted local areas.
Regulatory reforms appeared in the SBS in order to improve bank competitiveness and
their convergence with rest of European bank standards have required banks to adopt adequate
new strategies. As interest rates and geographical restrictions were removed, Spanish savings
banks have grown rapidly.  A series of mergers reduced their numbers by nearly 35% and enabled
them to operate nationwide and provide a wider range of banking services comparable to that of
the commercial banks.  Instead of focusing on expansion, commercial banks concentrated on
adjusting their businesses to meet the new competitive market.  Both types of institutions took
initiatives to accommodate increased requirements of the BIS capital adequacy standards required
by directives of the European Monetary Union.2
So far, the pro-competitive forces of banking liberalization appear to be strong, as banks'
markups have declined in both the deposit and loan markets.  Institutions that were not subject to
meaningful competition previously are apparently undertaking initiatives to survive in the new
environment.  However, it seems that depository institutions have not made substantial reductions
in their use of input (capital and labor) factors [Kumbhakar et al. (1999)].  The influence of the
old banking practice is still reflected in the weight of fixed assets and office expenses, and there is
7evidence of increasing labor expenses in the industry [Hasan et al. (1999)]. This note attempts to
unfold whether the organizational form plays substantial role in the excess use of factor inputs.
III.  Data and Estimation
Data
Our data set consists of 970 observations of which 480 are commercial banks and 516 are
savings banks over the 1986-95 period.  Annual data for savings and commercial bank are taken
from the “Anuario de la Confederacion de Cajas de Ahorros” and “Anuario Estadistico de la
Banca Española” respectively. As mentioned earlier, intense consolidation caused the number of
savings banks to decline from 77 to 50 during the sample period.  We were forced to delete some
of the institutions due to the lack of consistent and unstained data.
Although, our focus is primarily on the oninterest expense inefficiency (expense
preference), we include interest cost inefficiency given the unique ability of commercial banks to
raise funds from the capital market.  This type of financing capability of stock institutions may
lead to differences in interest structures between the two groups [Mester (1991)].  For the
Spanish banking industry, it may also provide an opportunity to capture the possible
consequences of interest rate deregulation during the late 1980s as well as to understand the role
of interest and oninterest rate expenditures as a strategy to attract depositors and borrowers.
Basch (1987) asserts that deposit interest rates and certain noninterest expenditures may be
substitutes for one another in a bank’s effort to attract deposits.  We investigate the noninterest
cost further by separately estimating the inefficiency associated with employee and office expense
components of noninterest costs.
Estimation of Cost Inefficiency.
8We used the econometric frontie  approach (EFA) to estimate cost inefficiency.3 In EFA
models, a cost frontier is estimated using a statistical procedure that decomposes the error term
into two parts: The first captures random disturbances and is assumed to follow a symmetric
normal distribution around the cost frontier; the second is assumed to capture inefficiency and is
usually assumed to follow a positive half-normal distribution above the cost frontier. These
measured inefficiencies may be the result of poor managerial performance (e.g., expense-
preference behavior, agency problems, incompetence) or of phenomena beyond management
control (e.g., local or regional economic conditions).4
We specify the cost function using the Fourier-flexible functional form, which combines a
standard translog functional form with the nonparametric Fourier functional form.  The translog
form is a local approximation that performs well for banks close to the sample means, but can
perform poorly for particularly small or large banks.  In the Fourier-flexible form, trigonometric
transformations of the translog variables are added so that the function globally approximates the
underlying cost or revenue function over the entire range of data.  Mitchell and Onvural (1992),
McAllister and McManus (1993), Berger, Leusner, and Mingo (1997), Berger, Cummins, and
Weiss (1997), Berger and DeYoung (1997) and DeYoung and Hasan (1998) all found that the
Fourier-flexible form dominates the translog form.  Use of such functional form is particularly
appropriate for analyzing the Spanish banking industry which consists of institutions that have
wide range of asset sizes.
9where the subscript that identifies individual banks has been dropped for simplicity.  C is cost; Y is
a vector of outputs, including total loans, other assets, and demand deposits; and W is a vector of
input prices including the prices of labor, physical capital, and borrowed funds.6 The Z’s are
functions that rescale the lnYj and the lnWm terms so that they fall on the interval [.1*2p , .9*2p].7
The error term h is a composite expression: h = lnU + lnV, where lnU captures cost inefficiency
and is distributed as a truncated normal variable, and lnV captures random error and is distributed
as a normal variable.8
We follow Mester (1993) allowing all parameters of the model to differ between mutual
(savings bank) and stock (commercial bank) institutions, i.e., it allowing the cost frontier and
error structure to differ.  We estimate a number of regressions of this cost function using interest
cost, noninterest cost, and its employee expense component as cost variables (dependent
variables).
Regression Model
Once we have attained the cost inefficiency scores from the cost function, we employ a
series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions to evaluate the potential determinants
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associated with such inefficiency.  In this study, however, we are most interested on the possible
influence of organizational form on different types of cost inefficiency scores.  The estimates
follow a specification as given below:
lnUi  = a0 + b1 * ASSETSi + b2 * C&CLOANi+ b3  * RSECURITYi  + b4  *  RETDEPOSITi
+ b5 * EQUITY i + b6 * LNLOSSi  + b7 * BRANCHi + b8  * ATMi  + b9 * MUTUAL i  + e i
where lnUi is the cost inefficiency for bank I; e i  is a random error term; ASSET is logarithm of
total assets and a proxy of size; C&CLOAN is commercial loans and consumer loans over assets;
RSECURITY is defined by the ratio of risky security of the banks over assets.  These three
variables are proxy for output mix and the complexity of the firm.  RETDEPOSIT represents
retail deposit over assets, a cheaper, traditional funding source representing liability management
strategy; EQUITY and LOANLOSS over asset ratios represent the current financial conditions
and strength of firms; BRANCH and ATMS are natural logarithms of the number of branch
offices and ATMs, respectively, representing operational strategy; and MUTUAL is the binary
variable differentiating mutuals (MUTUAL=1) from stock institutions (MUTUAL=0).
IV. Results
The combined inefficiency scores are reported in Table 1.  Panel A represents inefficiency
scores of estimations that assume a similar production technology between the two groups, and
Panel B represents inefficiency scores that assume a different production technology between the
two groups.9  Column 1 represents noninterest cost inefficiency scores, followed by its office and
employee expense components in columns 2 and 3, respectively.  Column 4 provides interest cost
11
inefficiency.   In both panels, the noninterest cost inefficiency is found to be significantly higher
for savings institutions compared to that of the commercial banks.10  However, the difference in
inefficiency scores  -  0.1268 for savings banks compared to 0.0413 for commercial banks  -  and
its statistical significance is stronger in panel B  (t-statistics 12.91) where the estimation assumed
a different production technology.
The findings are also similar when noni terest expenses are decomposed into two
components: office cost and employee cost.  In the office expense category, the difference is small
and the statistical significance of the difference is nonexistent in Panel A; however, the difference
between the two groups is significant in panel B.  For the employee cost estimations, saving
institutions reveal a significantly higher inefficiency score than that of commercial banks in both
estimates. These results are consistent with an expense-preference scenario by the mutual
institutions in the Spanish banking industry.  On the other hand, in the interest cost inefficiency
category, savings banks report a lower inefficiency score than commercial banks, thus rejecting
any competitive advantage in financing cost by stock institutions with a relatively higher access to
the capital market.  Later, the multivariate evidence reveals that savings banks’ lower interest
inefficiency is primarily driven by their dependence on cheaper retail deposits.11.
Table 2 provides multiple regression results that investigate the likely association between
organizational form and other pertinent variables with different dependent variables: noninterest,
interest, employee, and office cost inefficiency scores. Given that the regressions on yearly
samples are not significantly different from the combined estimations, we only report regressions
based on the complete sample.  We employ regressions using inefficiency scores estimated under
12
both assumptions of the same production technology (columns 1 and 2) and different production
technology (columns 3 and 4) between the mutual and stock forms of institutions.
First, we focus on the impact and statistical significance of the bivariate ‘mutual’ variable
on noninterest cost inefficiency reported in columns 1 and 3 of Panel A.  Although the "mutual
dummy" variable is positively related to the inefficiency score in column 1, the parameter however
is not statistical significant.  In column 3, we find a strong positive and statistically significant
(r=0.01) relationship between the mutual parameter and variability of the inefficiency score.
Interestingly, the model statistics (R-squared) for the regression in column 3 was significantly
stronger  -  62.85% versus 12.48%  -  than the model statistics of the regression in column 1.
This suggests a superior goodness of fit for the regression that uses inefficiency scores based on a
separate technology between the two groups (column 3).   In interest cost inefficiency
regressions, the evidence is somewhat consistent with previous findings based on univariate
statistics as the "mutual" variable reports an inverse relationship with the dependent variable in
both estimates.  Although the parameters of the variable are not statistically significant, the
evidence at least confirms that commercial banks do not have any competitive advantage in
financing cost.
We repeat a similar estimation using oni terest cost inefficiency components  - employee
cost and office cost inefficiency scores  -  as dependent variables.   The employee cost regressions
show stronger model statistics relative to the office cost regressions.  Evidence does that the
mutual variable has a significant impact on any of the dependent variables in estimates based on
the assumption of similar technology.  However, under the different technology assumption, we
see that the mutual parameter has a positive and statistically significant impact on the employee
13
cost inefficiency (column 3).  These findings are consistent with an expense- preference-prone
mutual form of organizations, especially when estimates are based on a different technology
assumption for the two types of organization.12
Focusing on other parameters, we find that asset variable portrays a positive sign in all
estimates, indicating that larger institutions are more associated with cost inefficiency and thus are
more likely to expense-preference-prone depository institutions irrespective of the form of
organizations considered.  Traditional institutions with a higher dependence on retail deposits as a
funding source are found to be less associated with employee inefficiency or expense- preference
behavior. The branch variable indicates that the higher network strategy is creating higher
inefficiency in all noninterest-related regressions as more capital and labor expenses are associated
with such decisions.  However, in respect to interest cost inefficiency estimates, the branching
strategy apparently helps to lower the inefficiency level.  Aggressive institutions with higher risky
assets in their portfolios are less associated with inefficiency.
Overall, there is a strong and positive correlation between mutual variable and noninterest
cost and employee cost inefficiency, especially when estimates of efficiency scores are corrected
for a different production technology, thereby indicating a higher expense-preference behavior by
the savings banks.  However, the evidence is not as overwhelming when we investigate the sample
assuming both forms of organizations have a similar production technology.  A likelihood ratio
test of the restricted model (same production frontier) versus (nonrest icted model (separate or
different production technology) indicated that the restricted model is strongly rejected by the
data at the 0.005 level of significance with a likelihood ratio test statistic of 130.91. Given this
14
result and similar conclusions in Mester (1993), we gave more importance to the result based on a
separate production technology.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper provides additional evidenc  in the existing debate on expense preference in the
banking industry. It uses data from the Spanish depository industry which has both mutual and
stock types of institutions.  By introducing a stochastic frontier analysis in estimating the best-
practiced expense-preference behavior, we have attempted to investigate the role of
organizational forms in determining the variability of expense inefficiency.  Assuming that mutual
and stock institutions follow different production technologies, we find significant differences in
noninterest and labor (employee) cost categories between both types of institutions. Evidence
suggests that savings banks are more noninterest-inefficient (or higher expense-preference) than
the commercial banks.  We also expand our study with a multivariate analysis to find a possible
correlation between inefficiency scores and organizational form as well as certain institutions-
specific lending, funding, and operational activities and strategies.  The evidence on expense-
preference behavior is consistent with previous findings, especially for the sample where
inefficiency scores are estimated assuming a different production technology.
Interestingly, despite higher expense preferences, the savings banks apparently recorded a
higher return on assets and increasing market share relative to the commercial banks, especially during
the post-deregulatory 1992-95 period.13   It is plausible that the new opportunities and  intense market
competition in the deregulatory environment caused higher noninterest expenses.  However, one may
also interpret such developments as a deliberate strategy by the savings banks to provide higher
salaries and incentives to workers (pay-for-performance) to compete with commercial banks in
15
the newly deregulated markets.  Further research is warranted in this area in order to reach any
definite conclusions.
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Table 1
Mean Cost Inefficiency Scores of Spanish Depository Institutions
Sample Noninterest
Cost
Inefficiency
Office Cost
Inefficiency
Employee Cost
Inefficiency
Interest Cost
Inefficiency
PANEL A
Estimate of Groups Assuming Same Production Technology
1 2 3 4
Commercial
Banks [Stock
Institutions]
0.1134 **
(0.0960)
0.0738
(0.0393)
0.1271 **
(0.0732)
0.0715 **
(0.0511)
Savings Banks
[Mutual
Institutions]
0.1455
(0.1281)
0.0798
(0.0506)
0.1489
(0.0711)
0.0402
((0.034)
Combined
Sample
0.1310
(0.1149)
0.0764
(0.0440)
0.1370
(0.1277)
0.0697
(0.0460)
PANEL B
Estimate of Groups Assuming Different Production Technology
Commercial
Banks
0.0413 *
(0.0130)
       0.0354 ***
(0.0312)
0.0864 *
(0.0867)
0.0858*
(0.0741)
Savings
Banks
0.1268
(0.0507)
0.0403
(0.0187)
0.1404
(0.0691)
0.031
(0.0192)
Note: *, **, ***= Significantly different from savings banks at the 1, 5, and 10 % significance level,
respectively.
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Table 2
Variables Associated with Inefficiency Scores
Ordinary Least Square Regressions
PANEL A
Dependent VariablesIndependent Variables
or Ratios Same Technology Different Technology
Noninterest Cost
Inefficiency
Interest Cost
Inefficiency
Noninterest Cost
Inefficiency
Interest Cost
Inefficiency
1 2 3 4
Intercept -0.109 -0.370  * 0.099   *         -0.026
Log of Assets     0.104  * 0.211   * 0.027   * 0.100  *
Commercial and
Consumer Loan Ratio
    0.098  * 0.045   * -0.035  *         -0.043  *
Risky Security Ratio     -0.010  ** -0.006  ** -0.010   ** -0.008  **
Retail Deposit Ratio     0.044  *         -0.172  * 0.001  *         -0.051 *
Equity Ratio      -0.031 ** -0.078  **           0.020  *         -0.001
Loan Loss Ratio       0.010  **          0.029  *           0.001  *          0.010  *
Log of Branch    -0.003  *         -0.169  *           0.075  *         -0.010 *
Log of ATM      -0.003  **         -0.001           0.001  *         -0.001
Mutual Dummy 0.004          -0.0001  0.003  **         -0.001
Model Statistics
Adjusted R-squared 12.48 % 39.90 % 62.85 % 30.26 %
PANEL B
Dependent VariablesIndependent Variables
or Ratios Same Technology Different Technology
Employee Cost
Inefficiency
Office Cost
Inefficiency
Employee Cost
Inefficiency
Office Cost
Inefficiency
1 2 3 4
Intercept  -0.184  * 0.134  * 0.004           -0.142
Log of Assets   0.317  * 0.017  *    0.175 *    0.051  *
Commercial and
Consumer Loan Ratio
 -0.248  *         -0.020  *            -0.141  -0.039  *
Risky Security Ratio           -0.072  *         -0.001  -0.038 *   -0.010   *
Retail Deposit Ratio  -0.024   *   0.009  **   -0.010 **          -0.001
Equity Ratio   0.021   *          0.004  0.027 *          -0.001
Loan Loss Ratio            0.003          0.005 *    0.002 **   0.002   *
Log of Branch            0.001         -0.032 * 0.048 *          -0.003
Log of ATM 0.004   *          0.001 *   0.001 **          -0.0002
Mutual Dummy            0.001          0.004   0.005 **           0.001
Model Statistics
Adjusted R-squared 28.23 % 8.06 % 48.84 % 20.79 %
Note: All ratios are relative to assets.  Log means natural logarithm. ** and *= coefficients are significant at the 1
or 5 % significance level, respectively.
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Endnotes
                                                 
1 See Berger et al. (1993) and Berger and Humphrey (1997) for an extensive review of the efficiency literature in the
banking industry.
2 For more details on the developments of the banking system in Spain, see Canals (1997).
3 The econometric, or “stochastic,” frontier approach was introduced by Aigner t al. (1977), and was made
tractable by Jondrow et al. (1982).  Bauer (1990) offers an overview of these methods.
4 See Cebenoyan et al. (1993) and Berger et al. (1993).
5 We estimated the cost equation using maximum likelihood techniques, and imposed the standard symmetry and
homogeneity restrictions on the translog portion of the model.  Factor share equations were omitted because
application of the usual cross-equation restrictions would impose the assumption that the given input proportions
were the allocatively efficient ones [see Berger 1993, p. 266].
6 The price of labor equals salaries and benefits divided by the number of full-time equivalent workers.  The price
of physical capital equals expenditures on equipment and premises divided by the book value of physical assets.
The price of borrowed funds equals total interest expense divided by total borrowed funds.
7 See Berger et al. (1997) for a derivation of, and a justification for, this truncation.
8 Stevenson (1980) has shown that the assumption of a truncated normal inefficiency distribution is more general
and more flexible than the assumption of a half-normal distribution.  Berger and DeYoun  (1997) show that the
truncated normal distribution results in lower estimates of average inefficiency for banks than does the half-
normal, but that the rank efficiency order of banks remains virtually identical across distributions.
9 Separate production technology means it allows all the parameters of the model to differ between mutual (savings
banks) and stock (commercial banks) institutions, i.e., it allows the cost frontier and error structure to differ
[Mester (1993)].
10   These results are consistent with Lozano-Vivas (1998).
11  Focusing further on the cost inefficiency scores on a yearly basis, we find results to be consistent with the
combined sample and they are not reported in the text.  Over the entire period, the savings banks show a higher
noninterest and employee cost inefficiency and lower interest cost inefficiency than the commercial banks. The
inefficiency scores for the sample savings banks in the post 1992 period show a minor decline.  This may be
indicating an improvement in reducing noni terest cost inefficiency after the initial and a little unstable
deregulation experience during the 1986-91 period. This could also be the result of an increased competitive
environment where managers were forced to lower, among other costs, the noninterest expenses.  All these
estimates are available upon request.
12 Mester (1993) revealed that the differences in total cost inefficiency between the mutual and stock U.S. thrifts
cease to exist when a separate production technology is used.
13 No descriptive statistics is reported in the text of this note; however, they are available upon request
